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IAC-M-272
18 December 1956

4. Briefings for Aircraft
Manufacturers


The Chairman raised for discussion the question of briefings for US aircraft manufacturers with respect to technical and scientific intelligence on Soviet aviation developments. General Lewis then outlined in considerable detail the nature of, and procedures used, in intelligence briefings given by the Air Force in connection with various types of Air Force contracts. Following an exchange of views on this matter, the Chairman suggested, and the members concurred, that no specific action be taken at this time, but that the question of such briefings, including some in related defense fields, might be considered further at a later date.

5. Scheduling of IAC Meetings

Noting that the next scheduled IAC meeting normally would be on 25 December, the members agreed not to meet during that week unless an emergency or special requirement arose. The Chairman also suggested, and the members concurred, that the next IAC meeting should be scheduled for the earliest day following 1 January on which pending business required such a meeting.

6. Syrian Situation

After Admiral Frost referred to reports of the movement of Soviet Bloc shipping to Syria, the members discussed this and certain other matters related to the Syrian situation.



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IAC-M-272
18 December 1956

8. Executive Session

At 1140 the Chairman requested certain of the members to remain for an executive session.

Adjournment: 1150




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Acting Secretary

SECRETARY'S NOTES

1. No objection having been raised by a member, the Secretary has authorized release to USIA of SNIE 30-7-56, "Probable Consequences of US Adherence or Non-Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," 14 December 1956 (IAC-M-271, 13 December 1956, Secretary's Note 3).

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IAC-M-272
18 December 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting Held in
IAC Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, at 1045, 18 December 1956

Director of Central Intelligence
Allen W. Dulles
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence,
Department of State
Major General Robert A. Schow, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Laurence H. Frost, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Major General Millard Lewis, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
United States Air Force
Brigadier General Richard Collins, Deputy Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Atomic Energy Commission representative
to the IAC
Mr. Ralph R. Roach, acting for Federal Bureau of Investigation
representative to the IAC

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IAC-M-272
18 December 1956

1. Approval of Minutes
13 December Meeting
(IAC-M-271)

a. Approved the minutes of the 13 December meeting
(IAC-M-271) as written.

b. Admiral Frost, referring to the minutes of the 4 December meeting (IAC-M-270, item 4), stated that the Navy had decided not to submit to the IAC any proposal for broadening the mandate of the Ad Hoc Current Intelligence Group for the Taiwan Strait Problem.

2. Watch Committee Report
No. 332

Noted this report.

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IAC Meeting, 18 December 1956

ALSO PRESENT

Central Intelligence Agency

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Mr. Robert Amory, Jr.
Mr. Sherman Kent


Mr. Otto Guthe

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Department of State

Mr. David G. Wilson
Mr. William Magistretti

Department of the Army

Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Pratt
Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Husman

Department of the Navy

Captain William S. Howell

Department of the Air Force

Colonel P. D. Wynne
Lieutenant Colonel Van A. Woods, Jr.

The Joint Staff

Colonel Charles H. Dayhuff, Jr., USA
Captain Gordon Fowler, USN

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz

NEW YORK Herald Tribune

16

Friday, December 7, 1956

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For Action on Air Power

As a result of serious concern over the rate of American military aircraft production expressed to this newspaper by certain airframe manufacturers, the Herald Tribune undertook to get the facts. Our reporters, Mr. Robert Bird and Mr. Tom Lambert, talked to makers of airframes, power plants and electronic equipment.

Not yet satisfied that the concern was valid, they talked exhaustively to key officers in the Air Force and to numerous Pentagon officials. They discovered that at the highest levels of Air Force career officers the same concern was felt. Air Force and production people agreed that a bad situation existed and had to be improved.

This newspaper then carefully examined—in the field and in Washington—research, development and production records on some of the latest bombers and fighters, including the B-52, B-58, F-102, F-104 and F-106. In each case, Air Force officers and industry personnel agreed that lead time was excessive; that red tape, indecision and too much paper work were the principal factors in this, and that lead time could be cut by from 25 to 50 per cent.

It was also discovered that the Soviet Union apparently was turning out certain advanced designs in larger numbers and in two-thirds to one-half the time required by this country. The American B-52 took eight years and three months to pass from the original concept to production; the F-102 required seven years; the B-58 will take more than eleven years. Meanwhile, the Soviet jet intercontinental heavy bomber, the Bison, comparable to our B-52, took from four to five years.

An element in this situation, contributing to the American time lag, is the fact that technical and scientific intelligence on Soviet aviation advances is not reaching our manufacturers. In fact, for lack of sufficient liaison between intelligence and the American aircraft industry, the former does not know in adequate detail what to search out and report upon.

There is no basic disagreement on these facts at any level of real competence.

The Defense Department in recent months has taken some belated cognizance of this situation. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Reuben B. Robertson, has sent out a letter to the principal aircraft manufacturers on the

problem. In the opinion of those manufacturers it does not go to the heart of the matter. Certainly, it is not a masterpiece of clarity. Enigmatically, the letter states: "The implementation of this program will be chiefly by the military departments in the manner best suited to them."

This newspaper believes that:

1.—Decision-making authority within the Pentagon and the Air Force must be centralized. Quick and clear decisions are not now being made because of the multiplicity of committees passing on projects.

2.—Mr. Tom Lanphier, vice-president for planning of Convair, summed up two necessary reforms neatly: "Give Air Force officers who deal with us enough position of authority to make on-the-spot decisions by themselves. Then formally give us the management responsibility they feel we can handle to get the job done quickly."

3.—Greater efforts should be made to disseminate scientific and technical intelligence available on Soviet progress to manufacturers, and the Central Intelligence Agency should be thoroughly briefed by the industry on what items are important.

Beyond these procedural reforms, the Air Force and the Defense Department should be guided by the broad principle that to delay decisions in striving for perfection, for planes and equipment that shall never be outmoded, is not the method of assuring that the United States shall have better weapons, in larger numbers and in shorter time than the Soviet Union right now.

If certain areas of the Defense Department were operating as a competitive business, following the system which it presently employs, it would shortly be facing bankruptcy. As the organization to which the United States and the free world looks for security against aggression, its responsibility is far greater than any private business venture. Many aircraft manufacturers are frank to state that they do not think any substantial improvement can be made under the existing system, that a wholly fresh approach must be made.

The Herald Tribune believes that within the Eisenhower administration lies the will and the talent to meet the situation once the facts are made known. In that conviction it has made its study of the aircraft problem and in that conviction it urges action—now.

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

14 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special IAC Meeting on 14 December 1956

1. Pursuant to agreement of the IAC at its meeting on 13 December (IAC-M-271, 13 December, item 7 b), the IAC met at 1015 on 14 December (prior to the previously scheduled USCIB meeting) to consider a proposed revision of paragraph 19 of SNIE 30-7-56, "Probable Consequences of US Adherence or Non-Adherence to the Baghdad Pact" (see memo to IAC, 13 December 1956).

2. Members or representatives present included: General Cabell (presiding), Mr. Armstrong (State), General Schow (Army), General Lewis (Air), Admiral Frost (Navy), Colonel Van Orman (Joint Staff), and Mr. Kuhrtz (FBI). AEC was not represented. CIA personnel present included: Mr. Kent, [REDACTED]

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3. After discussion of the proposed draft, the members approved the revised para. 19, as amended, and a corresponding amendment of Conclusion C. This action was recorded as a footnote to item 7 b of IAC-M-271, 13 December. At the same time the Joint Staff provided footnotes to certain paragraphs which it wished included in the printed text.

[REDACTED]

Acting Secretary

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IAC-M-271
13 December 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting Held in
IAC Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, at 1045, 13 December 1956

Director of Central Intelligence
Allen W. Dulles
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence,
Department of State
Major General Robert A. Schow, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Laurence H. Frost, * Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Captain William S. Howell, * acting for Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Colonel Robert A. Breitweiser, acting for Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Colonel E. G. Van Orman, acting for Deputy Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Atomic Energy Commission representative
to the IAC
Mr. Ralph R. Roach, acting for Federal Bureau of Investigation
representative to the IAC

* Part of meeting

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IAC-M-271

13 December 1956

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2. Introduction of Captain Lowrance

Admiral Frost introduced Captain V. L. Lowrance, Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence for Security, to the members.

3. Approval of Minutes
4 December Meeting
(IAC-M-270)

Approved as written.

4. Watch Committee Report
No. 331

Noted this report.

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IAC-M-271
13 December 1956

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7. SNIE 30-7-56

Probable Consequences of US
Adherence or Non-Adherence
to the Baghdad Pact

a. Agreed that the title of this estimate should be, "Probable Consequences of US Adherence or Non-Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," and that the classification of this title should be "Official Use Only."

b. Approved this estimate, as amended, subject to later consideration by the members of a revision of paragraph 19 of the 10 December draft (and any corresponding addition to the Conclusions), to be prepared subsequent to this meeting.*

c. Agreed to defer consideration of the question of the release of this estimate to USIA.

* On 14 December the members approved a revision of paragraph 19 and a corresponding amendment to Conclusion C.

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IAC-M-271
13 December 1956

8. Situation in Laos

After the Chairman referred to certain developments in Laos, the members discussed this matter and agreed that the seriousness of this situation should be called to the attention of their principals.


Adjournment: 1300



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Acting Secretary

SECRETARY'S NOTES



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IAC-M-271

13 December 1956

3. Unless objection is raised by a member at the next regular meeting of the IAC, the Secretary proposes to release to USIA, SNIE 30-7-56, "Probable Consequences of US Adherence or Non-Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," 14 December 1956.

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IAC Meeting, 13 December 1956

ALSO PRESENT

Central Intelligence Agency

Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell
Mr. Robert Amory
Mr. Sherman Kent

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Mr. Otto E. Guthe

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Department of State

Mr. Albert Irving
Mr. Manfred Halpern
Mr. David G. Wilson

Department of the Army

Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Pratt
Lieutenant Colonel Howard Thompson
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Bonnaffon

Department of the Navy

Captain V. L. Lowrance

Department of the Air Force

Colonel P. D. Wynne
Colonel H. E. Cotter
Mr. John A. Power
Mr. Donald F. Benjamin
Lieutenant Colonel Van A. Woods, Jr.

The Joint Staff

Colonel Charles H. Dayhuff, Jr., USA
Mr. John W. Easton
Colonel A. Ward Gillette, USA
Colonel Ralph W. Wade, USAF

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz